The pandemic was the biggest economic disturbance since the second world war. In both cases supply chains were severely disrupted, either by German U-boats or, more recently, factories and borders closed to stop the spread of disease. On the face of it, though, we have got off relatively Scot-free. We haven’t seen the massive fall in GDP experienced after the war. In fact we saw a sharper fall in GDP in the 2008 financial crisis.
What is different is how we have handled the readjustment. After the war the focus was on growth, with very low interest rates, even though the inflation rate in Britain almost reached 17%. This time we’re told growth is again the focus, but the policies being applied, by governments and central banks, seem to suggest otherwise.
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[00:00:00] The largest fall in output for more than 300 years, not expected to return to pre-crisis levels
[00:00:08] until the fourth quarter of 2022. Underlying debt is forecast to continue rising in every year.
[00:00:16] This is the Debunking Economics podcast with Steve Keen and Phil Dobbie.
[00:00:22] Well that was for my UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak talking about the devastation caused to
[00:00:27] the economy by Covid, but we have been through tougher times. How did the economy go with the
[00:00:33] Second World War for example? Was there anything we could have learned from that experience? Because
[00:00:38] it does feel like we're going to be paying for Covid for a long time yet to come. That is this week
[00:00:43] on the Debunking Economics podcast me and Steve Keen welcome along.
[00:00:55] So some numbers to start with Steve which I'm getting from our world in data.org which has
[00:01:00] got a lot of numbers on that website. UK GDP in pounds adjusted for inflation so in value terms
[00:01:07] the equivalent to 2013 British pounds GDP in 1945 at the end of the war was £301.6
[00:01:15] billion. The next year it was £292.8 billion so in real terms almost a 3% fall in GDP. It fell a
[00:01:24] bit more in 1947 to £288.9 billion so over those two years basically we saw a 4.2% drop in GDP
[00:01:31] in the UK. That was it the consequence of the end of the war. I mean it's quite a fall but
[00:01:36] as you can imagine we haven't actually seen anything like that despite the ravages of
[00:01:40] the pandemic have we. So even though 4.2% sounds like well you know given it was a war not bad
[00:01:46] but we had a pandemic and we didn't even see that you know over the over the two years that
[00:01:51] followed so have we have we got off scot-free? Well in one sense in the economic sense what we
[00:01:57] did was and this is the point that people just can't get their heads around after an event
[00:02:02] which they're saved by by this very factor. The government dramatically increased spending at
[00:02:07] the time and it had to if it hadn't decreased the spending then there would have been everybody who
[00:02:12] couldn't go to work would have been and it'll pay their rent or their mortgage their lender or
[00:02:17] their landlord would have been in the same situation with their finances we would have
[00:02:21] had the biggest financial crash in history. We didn't and then the real reason was
[00:02:27] suddenly governments discovering they can create money which is a sort of thing you know
[00:02:31] myself and my hearty band of not orthodox economists they're arguing for going on a century now not
[00:02:38] being listened to when it comes to a crisis that can be put into effect and in some ways the same
[00:02:43] thing applies for the world. Although they haven't they haven't totally accepted that that because
[00:02:46] they've gone back to the same old bullshit again I mean the stuff that Reeves is coming out with
[00:02:50] you know I'm pretty certain she actually has deliberately taken Keynes's old statement
[00:02:55] if we can do it we can afford it and turn it around if we can't afford it we can't do it.
[00:03:01] That has taken us back we're now in a pre-Keynesian world and we look back to the 19th century we had
[00:03:08] a major financial crisis every 10 to 15 years and these people think they're stabilizing the
[00:03:14] economy and they're putting us back to the chaos and instability of the 19th century.
[00:03:19] So people are suffering obviously I mean you know we talked a week or two back about my own
[00:03:26] family and how they're suffering as a consequence of all of this which is definitely the result of
[00:03:30] the slowdown that's resulted from the pandemic but generally compared to the end of the war
[00:03:36] I mean the OBR you know which is a bit of a right-wing forecasting think tank.
[00:03:42] No no no it's not a bit of a right-wing it's a right-wing forecaster.
[00:03:45] They are saying that real tax income per person is going to return to pre-pandemic levels
[00:03:52] so the levels as they were in the final quarter of 2019 will be back there by 2025.
[00:03:59] So even though we've had you know the policy of almost like austerity almost back at austerity now
[00:04:05] really aren't we yeah as we try and recoup those losses that from government spending that's the
[00:04:11] way they see it even given all of that we're you know the impact is going to be like a five-year
[00:04:18] impact and we're back where we were. Yeah yeah and it shows the effect of it shows
[00:04:23] the effectiveness of what they're now shutting down which is government spending as a counter-cyclical
[00:04:29] input to an unstable market system and the crazy thing is this is the pandemic is the first time
[00:04:37] that a downturn has been caused by the only method that neoclassical economics allows for
[00:04:43] downturns which is exogenous shocks. So he got an exogenous shock you know from you know maybe it's
[00:04:49] not entirely exogenous that the fact that we've got a pandemic spreading has got a lot to do with
[00:04:54] how we're putting pressure on the planet from the economy itself but you know it was almost
[00:04:59] like a medial strike in that sense hitting everywhere bang the economy goes down bang
[00:05:03] it's right up again and why because of government spending which the slot think is dangerous it is
[00:05:09] you know the capacity of people to forget that's one thing I'm going to say that Reeves is more
[00:05:13] exceptional than her 1945 counterpart she's forgotten even faster than they did. Well we spent of
[00:05:20] course our way out of the war didn't we well we spent our way into the war spent our way
[00:05:23] through the war and spent our way out of the war because because we had to yeah you can't outsource
[00:05:28] a war to the private sector the private sector does very nicely thanks very much out of
[00:05:32] making the arms but they you know they're not the ones who finance the purchases so yeah it's it's
[00:05:38] just this and then this it is so tedious to be someone who's been part of a tradition that goes
[00:05:46] back to the 1910s actually with Sean Paterson you can even drag it back earlier earlier to the
[00:05:52] fights people had against Adam Smith and David Riccardo with their attitude about money way
[00:05:55] back in the 1800s and late 1700s for that matter but the practicality the reality is that
[00:06:01] governments create money they don't borrow it that money is not a commodity money is a
[00:06:06] promise to pay the government's one of the two sets of institutions that create that promise to pay
[00:06:11] the other being the private banks that it does it without creating debt for the private sector
[00:06:15] unlike the private banks all this stuff has been known for you know from my entire
[00:06:20] intellectual career and five times as long back in time and we continue going back to
[00:06:25] the same ludicrous religion that believing the government is borrowing and that's really
[00:06:29] dangerous we can't have it happen right and and that didn't happen in 2008 so we had a bigger dip
[00:06:34] in GDP in 2008 so in 2007 UK GDP was 1.54 trillion two years later it was 1.46 trillion so that was
[00:06:43] actually a five percent drop in two years way bigger than the four we've seen well after the
[00:06:48] war and after the pandemic and that again showed that that stage you had basically this is what
[00:06:53] happens when you have a neoclassical economist in charge and this is the frustrating thing
[00:06:58] they don't know anything about the real economy there are experts and a model of the economy which
[00:07:02] is fundamentally wrong and then what that means is when the crisis like the global financial
[00:07:07] crisis hit which as you know is one of the people you know that's on one large way we
[00:07:10] met I was warning about it so much you couldn't help but hear me on the on the Australian
[00:07:15] radio waves and news programs um but they had no idea it was coming and then when it hit them
[00:07:21] they reached their textbook and the textbook said oh give money to the banks and the banks
[00:07:25] will lend it out when again the brooch to economics that I'm part of has known for over a century
[00:07:30] that banks can't lend out reserves so the whole idea that that could create so therefore
[00:07:35] we because they were completely caught by surprise and they weren't aware of the severity of the
[00:07:40] the level of private debt that caused the whole thing they flummoxed and and they put
[00:07:45] their own textbook stuff into uh effect and what we got was the slowest recovery from a downturn
[00:07:50] in basically in the history of american capitalism is not even you know just a haul in the stupid
[00:07:56] two fallacious arguments there one was you know the whole thing about lending out reserves the other
[00:08:00] one was people actually wanting to borrow when the chips are down I mean you know if the economy
[00:08:05] is not growing why borrow exactly and then it says you know straight ordinary common sense
[00:08:10] in that sense is better than doing a bhd and economics and swallowing the the bullshit
[00:08:16] you consume from your lecturers which you then reproduce and dump on top of the society so what's
[00:08:21] changed in terms of jobs then so the unemployment rate was low after the war for obvious reasons I
[00:08:25] mean there were fewer people to start with there was the survivors there was a lot of work for them
[00:08:29] to do a year later in 1946 a year after the war unemployment peaked at 2 percent
[00:08:36] there is a long way from the 10 percent that we saw in the late 80s and early 90s all the 15
[00:08:42] percent that we saw before the war but of course now again the unemployment rate is very low so is
[00:08:48] that a similar situation to after the war there's you know people who have been made ill because
[00:08:54] of the pandemic and there's still a lot of work to be done yeah well I mean there's certainly
[00:08:57] a number of people who've made all because of the pandemic is far larger than most people realize
[00:09:01] they there are some people who've been able to retire uh because they you know they were
[00:09:06] you know I mentioned a lot of finance sector people have been in this situation
[00:09:10] cushy job cushy pension if they can't manage to work anymore they can afford to retire
[00:09:15] but the impact on the number of people who are looking for jobs has fallen quite radically
[00:09:19] and that therefore means the unemployment rate is artificially lowered by that
[00:09:23] medical phenomenon not buying economic funds and then productivity so productivity increased a lot
[00:09:30] after the second world war so between 1945 and 1964 output per hour worked increased by
[00:09:37] 3.7 percent each year from 2008 to 2020 that had fallen to half a percent and of course since the
[00:09:44] pandemic we've even lost that haven't we I mean so that is the the the big question mark isn't it
[00:09:48] where's how do you get an economy back on its feet if you haven't got any productivity growth well
[00:09:53] productivity growth is one of these again one of these misnomers from the mainstream they believe
[00:09:57] that productivity means people workers working harder no it doesn't it means workers working
[00:10:02] with better capital equipment and uh and that's what we saw dramatically after the second world
[00:10:06] war because one thing that happened during the war was an enormous amount of technological innovation
[00:10:11] to be able to fight and fight the wars successfully radar being one of the very first cases
[00:10:16] microwaves I think came out not much much later there's a dramatic amount of technology which
[00:10:20] was developed in the world war two which was then converted across to to you know
[00:10:24] consider civilian purposes in in the 1940s to 50s we have because again we have a bunch
[00:10:30] of neoclassical economists in charge and I read this stuff and I you know I wish I was reading
[00:10:36] kindergarten essay they'd show more intelligence they attribute productivity to how hard workers
[00:10:42] work and it's not it's how good the machines are that workers are working with which needs
[00:10:46] any capital investment for it and that's what's not happening at the moment yeah I guess it's a
[00:10:51] you know at the top level it's a difference in attitude isn't it between after the war
[00:10:54] well we've got to get back on our feet versus since the pandemic it's well we've got to
[00:10:59] repay our debt it's exactly a complete or in yeah that's right that's taken over and
[00:11:03] and that's one reason why you know you're not seeing I mean the financial sector
[00:11:08] in shumpa it is I must say fantasy of how this how the financial sector operates these are banks
[00:11:14] is providing working is providing seed money to entrepreneurs of course they don't do that
[00:11:20] they're what they did what they have provided is working capital than ordinary corporations
[00:11:24] and to the extent of those corporations are innovating you can get growth coming out of that
[00:11:30] they don't necessarily give money to people in startups but what they've got now they're
[00:11:33] giving money to people who want to buy and sell houses with a large mortgage so there's no way
[00:11:38] that that monetary creation capability of the private sector is boosting the capacity of firms
[00:11:44] to improve their manufacturing techniques so we've yeah we've just got the worst of all worlds
[00:11:50] yeah and of course what is very different is monetary policy so interest rates from 1932 I find
[00:11:58] this interesting from 1932 to 1951 interest rates in the UK were pretty much stuck at 2% they did
[00:12:05] rise briefly to 4% at the outbreak of the war but then came back down again to 2% and stayed there
[00:12:12] so all of this coping with the emergency interest rates stuck at 2% as though that wasn't a tool
[00:12:18] that needed to be used and it isn't a tool that needs to be used this is the frustrating thing again
[00:12:23] neoclassical theory has this fantasy that inflation is caused by what they call inflationary
[00:12:29] expectations so prices go up because you expect prices to go up and in that fantasy world of
[00:12:35] theirs putting up their interest rate is actually a pretty much people discount the value of future
[00:12:40] returns and therefore consume less I forgot which way the magic works basically I'm sick and tired
[00:12:49] of reading this stuff but fundamentally it's saying we can reduce the expectations by increasing
[00:12:54] interest rates now there's got bugger all to do with to do with that the inflation comes out of
[00:12:59] the extra monetary demand pumped into the economy by government spending which then enable firms
[00:13:04] to put up their markups which is the major cause of inflation while it happened during the
[00:13:09] pandemic along with the disruption to supply chains so I've got people playing with the who
[00:13:14] understand a toy model that have got the right to play with the real world and one of those one
[00:13:19] little factoid I quite enjoy there's a great book on statistics decades old by a guy called
[00:13:25] erinberg titled as data reduction I gave it away to a student which is the piece of generosity
[00:13:29] I regret never came back but in that book he was written back in the 1930s or 1940s I think
[00:13:35] and his example of a constant was the rate of interest yeah well and that's the way it was from
[00:13:42] 1932 to 1951 it was it should be yeah the whole idea you make it a variable to control the economy
[00:13:48] is nonsense yeah and even though inflation did shoot up just straight after the war so it reached
[00:13:53] in 1940 it reached 16.8 percent felt a 10.8 percent in 1941 7.1 percent in 1942 then it was sort
[00:14:01] back down to 3.4 percent in 1943 and all that time interest rates 2 percent just didn't touch them
[00:14:08] wasn't seen as a way of dealing with inflation yeah this again again is neoclassical theory again
[00:14:12] though the Keynesian approach and argued that the fiscal policy is more powerful because it
[00:14:18] is a direct injection of money into the economy which is true okay but the neoclassical law
[00:14:23] know they make this mythical idea that if the government runs as deficit now uh that
[00:14:28] rational agents this is very important you know rational agents like nostrodomus and jesus
[00:14:34] they can predict that that future means they're going to have to tax more in the future
[00:14:38] so they save money which counteracts the impact of government spending that's the bullshit that
[00:14:44] that that is lies behind behind the but we haven't but we don't have that tool now do we because
[00:14:50] we've got that mindset by the way by comparison you know so the inflation in 1940 got up to
[00:14:54] 16.8 percent we got up to 9.1 percent in 2022 7.3 percent in 2023 it's expected to fall to 2.2
[00:15:01] percent this year which is sort of like a comparison to it falling to 3.4 percent in 1943 having been
[00:15:07] much higher but of course you know we had a pandemic could still buy stuff we went
[00:15:11] blockaded by the Germans so you know the impact on supply wasn't quite so big
[00:15:16] but look it came down then just as it's coming down now it came down then without
[00:15:21] monetary policy but we have to rely on monetary policy now because we've told ourselves that we
[00:15:26] can't inject more public sector money into the economy because we've already done that and now
[00:15:31] we've got to reap it back so money should policies the only thing we've got so over to you central bank
[00:15:38] that's always I mean that's why that's why we are where we're at my favorite like my
[00:15:41] count example is actually not historical or geographical look at Japan Japan over the
[00:15:46] whole pandemic interest rates rose from minus I think it was minus point two per
[00:15:50] five a percent to zero that's all they did across the you bring up for the last 10 or 15 years they've
[00:15:55] been in negative interest rates on on the government bonds and then they went to zero and that's all
[00:16:01] they did and they had a lower rate of inflation lower increase in rate of inflation and the
[00:16:05] faster recovery than America or the USA or the UK that both thought they were manipulating
[00:16:10] the inflation rate using interest rate it has bugger all effects yeah but they've had a pretty
[00:16:14] stagnant economy for quite a long time as well as a result of all of them they but I mean
[00:16:18] that you know so they actually wanted inflation and they've quite happy to have it now as we've
[00:16:22] discussed in the past so look when we come back we I want to talk about
[00:16:27] unemployment rates and and where to from here and you know the whole issue of the supply chain
[00:16:33] as well you know how how we're coping with that how how we cope with that after the war
[00:16:38] how we're dealing with that now so many interesting comparisons on there we'll do
[00:16:42] that when we come back on the debunking economics podcast this means Steve Keane back in a second
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[00:17:51] this is the debunking economics podcast with Steve Keane and Phil Dobby
[00:18:03] okay so Steve the other big difference of course during the the war and during the pandemic was
[00:18:10] I mean both dealt with supply chain disruptions obviously it was bigger during the war because
[00:18:15] the Germans were trying to blockade UK food supplies so the response was to introduce rationing of
[00:18:23] course and I remember the tail end well maybe not the tail I remember seeing ration books I think
[00:18:28] rationing was over by the time I was born it did drag on for quite a while they went into the
[00:18:32] into the mid 50s didn't it in the UK and to buy stuff you had to most items or many
[00:18:38] items were rationed each person had to register at a shop they were provided with a ration
[00:18:44] book containing coupons the shopkeeper was given just enough food for their registered customers
[00:18:50] registered rationed items had to be purchased and paid for the normal way but their price
[00:18:56] was strictly controlled by the government and even other essential food stuffs that were
[00:19:01] enraged were also subsidized so basically we had price controls back then I guess that's what
[00:19:08] helped keep inflation well inflation still shut up but at least it you know it helped deal with that
[00:19:14] demand supply difference yeah I like it it's actually interesting making the same comparison
[00:19:19] in the United States because the inflation during World War one was much higher than the
[00:19:23] inflation during World War two yet this you look at the level of government money creation
[00:19:28] for World War one was about half that for World War two and the reason that you had lower
[00:19:33] inflation despite higher money creation in the second World War versus the first
[00:19:37] was that the Americans at this stage learnt from the practical experience of World War one
[00:19:41] and set up price commission with John Kenneth Galbraith as one of the most important people
[00:19:47] involved if not the head and their role was to encourage firms not to put up markups and workers
[00:19:55] not to make wage demands and what you've got got as a result here and rationing also I don't
[00:20:00] think America began to ration or they got needed to but but nonetheless you there was agreements
[00:20:05] from both sides of the fence both the workers and and the capitalists not to try to get more money out
[00:20:11] of the actually huge level of demand that was created by a war economy so the war economy
[00:20:16] drove America's unemployment rate from it peaked at 20 percent in 19 or 25 percent in 1932-33
[00:20:22] it hit 20 percent again in 1937 when they made the mistake of following the advice of
[00:20:28] conventional economists and trying to reduce government debt but then when World War one
[00:20:32] hill felt as zero and stayed there pretty much through the whole war period including when
[00:20:37] women were suddenly regained into the workforce having been kept out of it beforehand you know
[00:20:42] Rosie the Riveter and all that sort of stuff so you had a huge level of increased monetary demand
[00:20:51] but agreement not to have that translated to consumer price increases than it would
[00:20:57] but not not during the pandemic because we didn't have rationing but although
[00:21:02] it's into and we didn't subsidize foodstuffs etc but interestingly we did subsidize energy
[00:21:09] but we didn't ration energy and if you subsidize and you don't ration then you really are just
[00:21:16] giving money to the provider of that service yeah well you you you you wanted the energy to
[00:21:22] keep flowing that's that's for sure so there were you know there were we suddenly realized what was
[00:21:28] important what was vital during that crisis of course we've forgotten that immediately afterwards so
[00:21:32] you know for example nurses and doctors and college garbage men were essential and now the crisis
[00:21:38] has gone they're not essential anymore and we're treating them just as badly as we did
[00:21:41] before the pandemic but yeah it's a crisis human seem to need a crisis to to throw their
[00:21:48] nonsense away and really focus them on what the hill but the reason why energy prices went up
[00:21:52] obviously is because there was a shortage of supply that would do you know we so we couldn't
[00:21:56] need the demand so the moment you start saying well okay tell you what because prices have gone up
[00:22:01] so much the government is going to subsidize those those prices we're going to give you a
[00:22:06] a slug of money or actually we're going to give the energy companies this money direct which is
[00:22:10] which is worse so that your your price is subsidized so prices come down well the reason
[00:22:16] why prices were high was because demand was greater than supply so if you put government money in the
[00:22:21] situation you're not solving the problem are you if you're not changing behavior then there's still
[00:22:26] this big discrepancy we turn demand and supply the government money surely then is just going
[00:22:31] to the power companies who are saying thanks we'll add that to our profit line well i mean
[00:22:38] the whole problem is privatizing power to begin with of course you know that this that should
[00:22:43] never have been done again this is following neoclassical theory believing first of all believing
[00:22:47] marginal cost rises so we have marginal cost pricing being imposed on what is actually a
[00:22:52] demand driven spiky wholesale energy system but that causes chaos in the wholesale markets
[00:22:59] but yeah they you know you're getting exactly the same electrons regardless of who's supplying them
[00:23:04] and the infrastructure costs are the major factor by far in establishing a power network
[00:23:09] and the rate of return on that is so low that corporations into a poor job of it
[00:23:14] they're focusing upon short term rather than long term so there's all these we've we've
[00:23:18] stuffed the system up and we're now paying the price for it but the but the reason was because
[00:23:23] wholesale prices gone up because of you know because of the actually perhaps more to do with
[00:23:27] the war in ukraine than it was to to do with the pandemic but add all those circumstances together
[00:23:33] that was the cost wasn't it wholesale costs had gone up we had to import gas we had to
[00:23:39] import oil and you know became a big argument for ramping up the renewables and so becoming more
[00:23:46] self-sufficient for energy but at the state at that stage and we're still there now we
[00:23:50] hit rely a great deal on imports so we had to so the price of those imports
[00:23:55] that at the wholesale level was very high yeah i mean and and so we subsidize it
[00:24:01] but we but it's not going to change demand so what happened during the pandemic if you look at
[00:24:06] it more broadly is very different to what happened after the second world war during the second
[00:24:10] world war what we saw with energy after the pandemic was applying to food and a whole load
[00:24:16] of services so the government subsidized but they rationed i mean if in that situation
[00:24:22] if they'd said well we're not going to ration but we are going to help you with your food
[00:24:26] bill then food demand would obviously rise and the whole situation would you know they'd have to
[00:24:31] provide more support and it would just get out of kilter and you would have inflation so the question
[00:24:36] i'm asking is can you actually have price controls if you're not rationing the item that
[00:24:40] you're trying to control the price on quite possibly not i mean this is um you would have
[00:24:44] seen my good my good my tyrone canes is doing a brilliant work taking my approaches to economics
[00:24:50] and energy and climate and so on and money and putting all into a integrated model argued that
[00:24:56] with price controls reducing prices during a downturn which you know you whatever you got inflationary
[00:25:04] period you will put the price controls or top markups going up that feeds through to the
[00:25:08] rate at which firms invest on the other side and if they don't invest you don't get the same
[00:25:12] rate of technological improvements so you get you reduce inflation during the period that where
[00:25:17] you're imposing the control but it rises afterwards because of the the impact your policies also have
[00:25:21] on productivity so unless you look at the entire system yes you are going to cause perverse results
[00:25:26] like that so what you so okay and the other the other big difference between the you know the
[00:25:31] impact of the war and the pandemic has been inequality so after the war the uk actually
[00:25:36] became more equal the the share of income going to the top 10 percent of the population
[00:25:41] fell from 34.6 percent in 1938 to 21 percent in 1979 so started gliding down all the way through to the
[00:25:50] end of the 70s inequality fell during the pandemic as well just during the year the pandemic as high
[00:25:56] income earners couldn't work like the rest of us and their investments were looking pretty sick
[00:26:00] as well but since then of course well you know they've done really well the resolution
[00:26:07] foundation reckon this year 2024 to 2025 there's going to be a 1% fall in income real income for
[00:26:13] households in the bottom half of incomes and a 1% rise for the top half that is quite a big difference
[00:26:19] isn't and we can see that it's it's obvious that the rich are getting richer you know we talked
[00:26:23] about this case-shaped recovery and we're definitely seeing that again one of the most influential
[00:26:29] documents in my education about history as well as about economics was the white paper and
[00:26:34] employment written by nugget cumes in australia in 1945-46 and that just to quote the it's pretty
[00:26:41] much the exact words from that document what the policy was for the government going after the
[00:26:45] second world war so the aim of government policy is to maintain such pressure upon the economy as
[00:26:51] to guarantee a shortage of men rather than a shortage of jobs and that was in response to
[00:26:56] the experience of the great depression and the second world war where you know the working
[00:27:01] class suffered dramatically of course when the great depression itself they were the ones who got
[00:27:05] gash killed during world war two the level of military not there's not so much militarism but
[00:27:10] solidarity amongst workers that that generated and the realization that if we don't keep the
[00:27:15] working class on side we're going to have our society fall apart that changed the whole
[00:27:19] philosophy of government government behavior towards saying we have to provide for the majority
[00:27:23] of people rather than for the wealthy whereas what gave us in 1920s and 19 to boomer the
[00:27:28] 1920s and the bust of the 1930s was letting the private sector rip and we've gone back to that same
[00:27:34] mentality and we're getting the same effects and one final little point with my own modeling of
[00:27:40] the dynamics of the economy when you include private debt one of the weird but emergent
[00:27:46] properties of my model which turns up in the real data is that a rising level of private
[00:27:51] debt regardless of who borrows it ends up reducing the weight of share of GDP so by
[00:27:56] letting the finance sector rip it's not the capitalist to pay for that it's the workers they
[00:28:00] end up with a slower share of weight wages or a lower share of GDP we've done everything in
[00:28:05] fact an increase in equality in this system and we're wondering why people are complaining
[00:28:09] and of course you know with higher interest rates those with their investments and savings
[00:28:14] benefit yeah uh you know so this so really that you know this higher interest rates so
[00:28:19] it's high interest rates are benefiting some and disadvantageing others and the ones that they
[00:28:25] are disadvantageing are not the ones causing inflation that's the that's the issue isn't it
[00:28:30] they will go as a problem that is being solved supposedly by something which is actually improving
[00:28:37] the lot of those people who are actually causing the problem and again this is another piece of
[00:28:41] neoclassical blindness under this particular point i've got my fights with warren mosler
[00:28:44] on a range of issues he's right on this one he said that the higher interest rates
[00:28:48] actually end up being an income burst to the economy because when you're in interest
[00:28:53] rates from pretty much zero to interest of five and six percent on government bonds
[00:28:57] on the new bonds at least that was injecting money into the economy so people you're buying
[00:29:02] used to buy a bond for a thousand dollars and get you know want and get ten dollars
[00:29:07] per year income out of it now you're getting fifty and it's a safe a safe return there's been
[00:29:13] it actually a booster people who own share own government bonds and that's not your every no
[00:29:18] that's not your grandmother down the street it's not your mother-in-law it's the it's the ultra
[00:29:22] wealthy you can afford that as a hedge against the volatility of the stock market right so yeah
[00:29:27] because if you buy bonds i mean if a government if if a if the private sector is to buy government
[00:29:33] bonds then that's not new money in effect because the government's issued those bonds but
[00:29:37] it's getting getting bought with money that's already it's actually reducing the money and
[00:29:40] it actually reduces the money in the economy of course to do that to buy the bonds you use
[00:29:44] your deposit accounts your deposit accounts fall your value of bonds go up it's actually reducing
[00:29:48] the money supply and this is something another thing of the issue control rather than letting
[00:29:52] banks sell as many bonds as they damn well like to the non-banked uh non-bank sectors right but you're
[00:29:57] but your point about the the interest but but the yield being paid is that that means more
[00:30:01] money has to be pushed into the economy because the government's having to pay that that
[00:30:04] interest rates the higher the interest rate the more the government has to pay in that
[00:30:07] interest and so that's all new money into the economy that's the point yeah that's
[00:30:11] and that's stimulating the economy rather than reducing demand is what the neoclassical
[00:30:14] thing again they don't understand the money system so when you when you know that you know
[00:30:18] government creates money then if you have a high rate of government interest being paid
[00:30:23] you're getting more money creation by the government going into the economy no but is it
[00:30:27] going into the real economy or is it just getting lost in the finance sector mainly
[00:30:30] the finance sector but they do buy the occasional suv and uh you know and i'm
[00:30:36] high class ice creams so it feeds across into consumption but much more slowly than if you
[00:30:41] gave them money to the poor because of that thing called trickled down yeah yeah no no
[00:30:45] you keep on telling me you're not pronouncing it but strickla down yeah or just or just strickla
[00:30:52] down because it's very slow so look what about said germany then during the second one because
[00:30:56] they had hyperinflation of course before the second world war uh that was kept down after the war
[00:31:02] and again hey listen mate i'm not going to let you get away with that mistake um the hyperinflation
[00:31:08] was back in 23 and 24 it's over very rapidly and in fact i've seen a very interesting post just
[00:31:14] recently that i intend exploring further saying it was actually a tactic by the german government
[00:31:18] at the sage so the time to drastically reduce the reparation payments they were required to pay
[00:31:23] by the treaty of the side the by the by the time the hyperinflation was ridiculously high you
[00:31:29] you can't even graph the numbers on on a on a chart it's so ridiculous it's everything else is
[00:31:34] a flat line versus german uh german price index in 23 24 but it was over 1925 and now what what
[00:31:41] goes to the rise of hitler wasn't inflation it was deflation because this having made a sensible
[00:31:47] ploy to reduce the outstanding debt that the germans owed particularly to the french
[00:31:51] courtesy of the side trading which is what hyperinflation did uh when they then followed
[00:31:58] the advice of the mainstream economist in the 1930s and repaid a large amount of money that the
[00:32:04] bonds that have been purchased by by americans german bonds purchased by americans and that
[00:32:09] meant that the unemployment rate in germany hit five percent higher than america's worst
[00:32:14] unemployment rate 30 versus 25 that's what led to the rise of hitler right and after the war
[00:32:20] after he'd lost and hila was dead um they still you know inflation was still kept down
[00:32:26] um they the interest rate was four and a half percent at the end of the war
[00:32:29] but they kept prices down but everybody's you know continued to fall actually basically
[00:32:34] when we know it continued to fall right through to the turn of this century when it was down
[00:32:38] around three quarters of a percent and now you know it's been a little below or above one percent
[00:32:44] pretty much since the early 80s uh but it was four and a half percent straight after the war
[00:32:48] but was coming down they kept their inflation down really again wage controls rationing price
[00:32:54] freezes the same stuff that we were doing on the other side of the english channel yeah it's but you
[00:33:00] know i mean it's actually quite melbourne germany recently as you know i think it's for the new
[00:33:05] brandenburg airport and oh my god talk about the example of the collapse of german these
[00:33:11] reputation for excellence and a high quality uh was a appalling experience now germany of course
[00:33:17] is suffering from the dramatic increase in their energy costs they've they've shot down
[00:33:22] their nuclear power stations i mean germany used to be example of how to do things well they're in a
[00:33:26] bad way yeah yeah so and why is why are they doing so badly i mean apart i mean they were an export
[00:33:31] nation and they're because the export customer is not doing well either in in the china they were
[00:33:35] too reliant on china as a as an export customer i mean i guess that's a large chunk of it isn't
[00:33:42] yeah well i mean china's so you're particularly all the way through has become self-sufficient
[00:33:45] and they're doing it brilliantly at the expense of stupid economic managers in the west
[00:33:50] and then now of course they can do you know china will get to the point where it doesn't
[00:33:54] need to import for example from the netherlands anymore they won't need to buy buy machines from
[00:33:59] amsl which is not allowed to do anyway courtesy of politically inspired bands because of next
[00:34:04] time in the next three or four years i'm pretty certain china will have the capacity to produce
[00:34:10] silicon cutting machines as accurate as amsl's and uh you know it's fun to watch sense some
[00:34:17] sensible policy on one side versus stupid neoclassical ideology on the other so how do we deal
[00:34:22] with the next pandemic differently so monkey pot the later strain of monkey pox in the congo
[00:34:28] it's got quite a high death rate and quite a hard long period where it lies dormant but
[00:34:37] is infectious bit like the you know we saw with co vid and imagine if we you know so it's
[00:34:44] going to happen at some point isn't there will be another pandemic so how do we cope with it
[00:34:49] differently so we were right though we splurged a load of cash i'm not sure we'd do that next
[00:34:54] time in terms of government spending it's hard to impose price controls without rationing we
[00:35:04] we will obviously drop interest rates which is exactly what we did it's interesting wasn't
[00:35:11] we actually pushed up interest rates at the very beginning of the pandemic for some peculiar reason
[00:35:15] but then realized that might have been a mistake so what do we do differently and you know how
[00:35:19] much of it is learnings from the uh from from our response to the war health i think it has to
[00:35:24] be learning from the war response rather than the covert response with the covert response
[00:35:27] is a bunch of lunatics like borris johnson you know let the bodies pile high what an
[00:35:32] inspiring speech that would have been if he made it in parliament rather than the how number 10
[00:35:38] so we know we haven't learned like one thing i mean you know one thing i'm noted for is coming
[00:35:42] around my crazy mask yeah we've all been embarrassed by it yeah in wholesale prices you can buy 100 for
[00:35:49] 11 dollars which means basically it's 10 dollars a pop if you want to double the cost to uh
[00:35:54] did include distribution it's 20 bucks a pop so for 20 dollars per person you could get everybody
[00:36:00] in the uk and indeed the planet if you're like so there's 20 20 you know 10 just so there's 10 billion
[00:36:06] people that's 200 billion dollars would get everybody a mask that they were to build them in the first
[00:36:12] place of course but it's the technology is quite straightforward so 200 billion dollars far less
[00:36:17] than we spent during the pandemic would have a system of energy we wouldn't we wouldn't when you
[00:36:20] met in public you would not be transmitting or receiving a disease from somebody else now i know
[00:36:26] we won't do it but i'm going to buy 100 of those for my friends right that's going to be your
[00:36:30] response do not but i mean that's my response i've got the level of stupidity the government
[00:36:35] shown itself capable of misled by neoclassical theory is a large part of why they're so damn stupid
[00:36:41] i just don't want to know what's going to happen within next pandemic but uh we but government
[00:36:46] but a government spending basically and nothing nothing and the monetary policy has got nothing
[00:36:52] to do with it on the way in or on the way out and you know i mean the odds the odds are
[00:36:57] there'll be there's got to be something else like that in the next 10 years and as you say the
[00:37:01] monkey pox is one the other is bird flu um and yeah one is we know is transmissible to humans
[00:37:09] i think also between uh the other one is not yet but it's getting there so we know this is coming
[00:37:15] and the the crazy thing is are there people in authority and government do anything to prepare
[00:37:19] for it i expect not and saying to the saying to the bank of england well what are we going to
[00:37:23] do about this is probably not the question to ask is it uh just just say yeah 2 you just keep it at
[00:37:28] 2 percent we'll do what we did during the war and for the decades after 2 sounds good let's just leave
[00:37:34] it there and you guys go and get a universal basic income and stop stuffing things up not that you're
[00:37:41] vitriolic of course not that i'm vitriolic now i'm not i'm not pissed off with them at all and i
[00:37:45] could i i don't have no evil thoughts about them when i go to bed nothing nothing of that
[00:37:49] how dare you aspire gives fast dispersions that i do sir all right we'll catch you next time thanks
[00:37:55] Steve yeah the debunking economics podcast if you've enjoyed listening to debunking economics
[00:38:06] even if you haven't you might also enjoy the y-curve each week roger hearing and i talked to a
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